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Larry Butler*
Unemployed labor and unused capital stock
provide two measures ofthe available economic
capacity at the nation's disposal. In the past, the
two have generally followed the same path, and
most analysts have treated them as roughly
interchangeable measures of the amount of
pressure on resources. In recent years, however,
that relationship has come to appear considera-
bly weaker than before.
In the summer of 1978, capacity utilization
approached 85 percent of the nation's capital
stock-relatively tight in terms of the post-
World War II average of 81 percent-while the
unemployment rate stood at 5.9 percent of the
labor force-relatively slack in terms of the
postwar average of 5.3 percent. Thus the two
measures have been providing different signals
ofthe amount ofresource pressure in the econo-
my. The recent level ofcapacity utilization sug-
gests that we are already approaching full re-
source use, so that new supply pressures could
cause accelerating inflation. Indeed, on two
earlier occasions, capacity utilization went from
85 percent to the cyclical peak of 87-88 percent
very rapidly, within the space of two to three
quarters. But the recent unemployment rate
suggests that fiscal and monetary stimulus could
be applied for a protracted period with little
danger of accelerating inflation.
Which of these conflicting signals is correct?
Most recent studies have tried to show that the
signals may, in fact, not conflict as much as
seems apparent, because structural changes in
the economy have made it difficult to compare
the measures over time. According to some
labor-market studies, the shifting age-and sex-
composition of the labor force have tended to
increase the economy's "normal" rate efunem-
ployment, so that the current level is actually
close to "full employment."!According to some
capacitystudies,the OPEC-caused upsurge in oil
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prices has tended to lower the nation's potential
capacity to produce.
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In this article, we argue that it is not necessary
to resort to these structuralarguments toexplain
the current divergence ofthe unemploymentand
capacity-utilization rates. Rather, the two mar-
kets need not reach full-resource use at the same
point in business expansions, because capital
and labor supplies exhibit different cyclical pat-
terns. New additions to the capital stock are
concentrated in the mature-recovery portions of
cyclical expansions, while new additions to the
labor force are concentrated in a brief period
following cyclical troughs. Short-term move-
ments in the capital stock, unlike movements in
thelaborforce, arelargelydominated byshifts in
expected output. Firms make substantialadjust-
ments to their desired capital-output ratios in
short periods of time, through movements in
investment which are substantially faster than
the adjustments they make to changes in the
labor force-output ratio.
The standard Keynesian aggregate-demand
model includes only one factor market-usually
the labor market-but in this article we add a
second factor market-the capital market. Our
rationale is that capital normally adjusts more
rapidly than laborto changesineconomiccondi-
tions. The single-factor model has adequately
described most early-recovery periods, when
both labor and capital were in ample supply.
Again, the single-factor model has·adequately
described such mature recovery periods as 1956-
57 and 1967-69, which were capital-constrained
with high levels ofcapacity utilization, and also
labor-constrained with quite low levels ofunem-
ployment. In otherperiods, however, thatmodel
has provedtobe aninadequatedescription ofthe
cyclical process.
The two-factor model provides a better ex-
planation of three brief, but important, periods
oftransition to full employment-in 1955, 1965and 1973. More importantly, that model may be
relevant to the period immediately ahead, which
might be marked by capital constraints but also
by adequate supplies of labor.
3 Capital utiliza-
tion is already quite high, so that strong real
growth over the next half-year could place the
economy under significant capital constraints.
But the unemployment rate at that point could
still be close to 6 percent, which means that the
economy could sustain a capital-constrained
expansion for at least a year before the labor
market showed severe signs of tightness.
In such a period, high levels ofcapacityutiliza-
tion would tend to stimulate rapid investment,
prolonging the business expansion. This invest-
ment then would generate strong demands for
credit, applying substantial pressure on interest
rates. But it would be wrong to interpret rising
rates in this case as indicating an excessive
tightness of monetary policy-which might be
deemed inappropriate in view of the likelihood
ofcontinued high unemployment. Indeed, ifthe
monetary authorities resisted the upward trend
in interest rates, they could ratify the demand
pressures from the capital-investmentexpansion
and thus set off a new spurt ofinflation. Conse-
quently, policymakers should monitor closely
the signals from both the capital and labor
markets over the coming year.
Section I of this article describes the factor-
market regularities which tend to exist both in a
transition period where there is an excess supply
of only the labor input to production, and in a
mature-expansion period where there are no
excess factor supplies. The following section
discusses the implications ofthesefactor-market
movements for the cyclical changes in fixed
investment, labor-force growth and interest
rates. Section 3 discusses the derivation and
operation of the two-factor model, and the
concluding section describes the implications of
this analysis for current policy.
There are two special problems in treatingthe
published unemployment and capacity-utili-
zation rates as roughly equivalent measures of
the degree of pressure on the capital and labor
markets. These should be noted at the outset,
because their treatment in this article affects the
analysis at several points.
1. Measures of excess capacity are available
for manufacturingonly. The non-manufacturing
"service" industries have no comparable mea-
sure, largely because of the ambiguity of the
concept as applied to these industries. We here
assume that the cyclical timing, though not the
amount of fluctuation, in the size of the capital
stock in service industries is much the same as in
manufacturing.
2. Because excess capacity is measured for
manufacturing only, the obvious labor-market
comparison is with the unemployment rate in
manufacturing. In fact, those rates do have very
similar cyclical patterns, with both tending to
reach cyclical lows before the overall unemploy-
ment rate reaches its cyclical low. However, they
do so for very different reasons. Theearlytrough
in capacity utilization occurs because rising
demand causes producerstoexpandtheircapital
stock to meet this demand.
Other things equal, a larger capital stock
means lower capacity utilization. Theearlyturn-
ing point in manufacturing unemployment oc-
curs because the growing availability of good-
paying jobs in manufacturing brings about an
increase in the supply of manufacturing labor.
Thus manufacturing unemployment is a poor
guide to the general pressure on the labor mar-
ket, so that we may assume that the overall
unemployment rate is the appropriate measure
of the state of the labor market.
Because manufacturing capacity utilization
appears to be an adequate measure of overall
capital usage, and because the overall unemploy-
ment rate appears to be the best measureoflabor
supply conditions, we canmake thedirect factor-
market comparison provided in Section I with-
out danger ofinvolving an "apples and oranges"
type of inappropriate comparison.
I. Cyclical Behavior of Factor Utilization Rates
First, let us note some intrinsic weaknesses in
the factor-utilization data used in this section.
These numbers contain ambiguities. Both
capacity-utilization data and unemployment
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data are based on surveys, one ofmanufacturers
and the other of households. The questions
asked in the household survey are straightfor-
ward. The interviewer asks whethera person hadworked, or had looked for work, during the (Rather arbitrarily, the start of the transition
survey month. Even so, the survey fails to pick period is dated from the pointwhenJ.hecapacity-
up such phenomena as "discouraged utilization rate first exceeds 841;2 percent.)
workers"-people counted by the survey as Mature-expansion periods are defined as those
having dropped out of the labor force entirely, when capacity utilization remains high, and
but who in fact have simply given up all hope of unemployment as well has reached its cyclical
finding a job. low. This distinction between transition and
The analogous survey problem for capacity mature-recovery periods is most evident in the
utilization concerns marginal plant and equip- long 1954-57 and 1961-69 expansions (Chart 1).
ment. In the manufacturing survey, business Still, it is evident even in the relatively short
firms are asked to assess the degree of their 1970-73 expansion, when the period of low
capacity usage, compared to full use under cyclical unemployment continued over five full
"normal operating conditions." Each must de- quarters.
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cide whether pieces ofhopelessly obsoleteequip- In all ofthe post-Korea expansions, the rise in
ment-perhaps kept around to meet peak-load capacity utilization was slightly faster than the
problems-qualify as part of his "normal" ca- fall in unemployment(allowingfor thedifference
pacity. The answer will varyfrom firm tofirm, so in scale of the two series). In all except the
the concept ofcapacity utilization is intrinsically abortive 1958-59 recovery, capacity utilization
somewhat fuzzier than that of the unemploy- reached its peak before unemployment reached
ment rate. its trough. In each early-recoveryperiod, unused
As noted above, we here assume that service capacity and unemployment declined almost as
industries' economic behavior differs from man- rapidly as they rose during the preceding reces-
ufacturers' byatmost a scalefactor. Theassump- sion period, that process continuingtoaboutthe
tion may not be entirely true, because many seventh quarter of recovery.6
services aresubstantiallyless cyclical thanmanu- The 1970-73 expansion represented a partial
facturing. The analysis in Section III thus will be exception to this pattern, however. Real GNp?
supported by other evidence~forexample, the and capacity utilization rose during the early
cyclical behaviorofsuch series as investment and part of that expansion at about the same rate as
interest rates. The first step in this approach, in earlier cycles, but the unemployment rate did
however, must be an examination ofthe cyclical not drop appreciably below the 6.0-percent
character of movements in the factor-utilization recession-trough figure until late 1972, six quar-
rates themselves. ters after that trough. The jobless rate then
Three postwar business expansions have averaged 4.8 percent duringthe mature-recovery
reached full maturity-in 1954-57, 1960-69 and period~-afull percentage point above the aver-
1970-73 (Table l)4-and the current period may age for the two previous mature recoveries. This
yet reach the same stage. Transition periods are difference in movement is attributable, first, to
defined as those when capacity utilization first the post-Vietnam reversal ofthe artificial lower-
approaches its peak level but when unemploy- ing ofthe civilian laborforce associated with that
ment still remains above its cyclical lowpoint. conflict, and second, to the influx of unskilled
Table 1
Factor Usage and the Rate of Inflation in Three Expansions
Capacity Utilization Unemployment Rate Inflation Rate
1954-57 1961-69 1970-73 1954-57 1961-69 1970-73 1954-57 1961-69 1970-73 --------------- --- ---
Year before transition 80.1 82.8 83.1 5.5 5.6 5.8 1.9 1.4 4.5
Transition period* 86.0 87.2 86.5 4.6 4.9 5.2 2.9 2.0 5.0
Mature expansion** 86.2 87.4 86.9 4.1 3.7 4.8 3.3 4.4 9.1
Year after end mature
expansion 75.3 78.2 73.1 6.5 5.0 7.0 1.3 5.1 9.8
*
**
Dating of transition periods: 19551-195511: 19631V-1965IV: 1972IV-197311.
Dating of mature expansions: 19551Il-1957111: 19661-1969IV: 1973IIl-1974IlI.
33younger workers and women workers into tht:
labor force.
A systematic difference between the two series
has typically emerged after the early-recovery
period.
8Onaverage, capacityutilizationstopped
rising after the seventhquarterofrecovery, while
unemployment continued to fall slowly through-
out the expansion. All of the complete post-
Korea expansions-again with the exception of
the abortive 1958-59 recovery-went through
such a transition period and then entered a
mature-expansion period marked by both full
employment and full capacity utilization.
A striking regularity has been the narrow
range of movement of capacity utilization in
both the transition and mature-recovery period
of the average cycle. This is doubly striking in
view of the fact that the capacity utilization rate
exhibits five times as much overallcyclical varia-
tion as the unemployment rate.
9 Yet given its
smaller relative movement, the unemployment
rate clearly has varied more than the capacity-
utilization rate from cycle to cycle. Asubstantial
difference can be observed between the 3.7-
percent average jobless rate of the 1966-69 ma-
ture recovery and the 4.8-percent rate of the
1973-74 mature recovery. This variation under-
lines the importance ofstructural elements, such
as the demographic factors cited above, in deter-
mining the level of full employment. The labor
market thus contains an element oflong-period
adjustment to changing demographics as well as
a normal cyclical adjustment-as we are certain
to see over the next decade as those earlier
factors begin to reverse themselves.
Another strong regularity during these cycles
has been the tendency for full-employment peri-
ods to determine the timing of accelerated-
inflation periods. Both ofthe major inflationary
bursts-in 1966-69 and 1973-74-occurred dur-
ing periods ofmature expansion. In both cases,
the labor and capital markets showed consider-
able tightness, with little variation in either the
capacity-utilization rate or the unemployment
rate. Price acceleration also appeared to be
relatively large during the 1956-57 mature ex-
pansion, although it tended to be swamped by
the generally declining trend in the inflation rate



















90II. Cyclical Patterns of Factor Growth
obsolete capital fairly quickly, but the same
cannot be saidfora groupofskilled workerswho
are displaced by new technology.
Accordingto the evidence ofthetwostrongest
expansions (1954-57and 1961-69),capacityutili-
zation and labor utilization tend to move differ-
ently in the later stages of expansion, with
capacity utilization turningdownlongbefore the
unemployment rate reaches its low point (Chart
1). Because the two series tend to move together
in the preceding recession and early-expansion
phases, their divergent behavior in laterstages of
the cycle suggests substantially different cyclical
behavior on the part ofthe underlying stocks of
labor and capital (Chart 2). The two series
exhibit similar cyclical amplitudes; the labor
force increases over the cycle by about I percent
of the underlying stock, while the amount of
investment increases by about I Yz percent ofits
stock. However, theirpatterns ofmovementvary
considerably.
All of the cyclical increase of the labor force
typically occurs in the first year of expansion,
and is then followed by a prolonged period of
stagnation or decline. Thus the most substantial
growth occursin theearly-recoveryperiod,when
the level of aggregate demand (though not its
growth rate) is still low. This pattern reflects the
underlying secular nature of labor-force
growth-plus a discouraged-worker effect, with
some potential workers leavingthelaborforce as
Chart 2
Cyclical Changes in Capital Stock and the Labor Force
(Average of five post war cycles)
As we have seen, thecapitaland labormarkets
exhibit some difference (although sometimes a
modest difference) in their cyclical rates of ad-
justment. This distinction may be traced to the
pronounced difference in the cyclical growth
patterns of the underlying stocks-business
fixed capitaland the labor force. Thatdifference
in turn probably reflects different treatments of
fixed and variable production inputs. Capital in
principle is a hybrid kind offactor; large quanti-
ties of available capital will be left unused in
recessions, but will then bebrought back into use
during mature recoveries-depending on the
level of aggregate demand and hence on the
quantities available of variable production fac-
tors. However, this characteristic may not be
shared to the same extent by the labor input.
Fixed factors are those production inputs
whose available quantities are relatively inde-
pendent of current rates of production. The
desired stock ofa fixed asset responds primarily
to changes in the expected flow of services the
asset will yield over a long span of time. Asset
holdings should adjust slowly to changes in
relative prices as all expected future flows of
services become adjusted to the current market
rate ofreturn. Because ofthe slowness ofadjust-
ment, fixed-factor markets will often appear to
be in a state of excess supply, yet with no
significant decline in rates of return. To explain
this, we mayassume that theexpected future rate
of return is high enough to make current owners
ofunused assets willing to continue to hold them.
Firms will not scrap unemployed capital as long
as they expect those assets to be profitable in the
future; instead, they will simply report those
assets as idle capacity.
In principle-although not necessarily in prac-
tice-the same argument applies to the labor
market. II We may assume that expected wage
ratesare high enough to persuadecurrent owners
ofunused skills-the unemployed-tobe willing
to continue in the labor force. In the labor
market as in the capital market, these resources
are availablefactors for further expansion ofthe
economy.But from the overall view of society
rather than the limited view of individual firms,
labor is the major long-run fixed factor in the









succeeding troughmarket conditions worsen, but then returningto
the labor force as demand picks up in the early-
recovery phase. Investment demand,incontrast,
is strongly pro-cyclical, so that its movements
cannot be explained in the same way as the
movements of the labor force. Again, its move-
ments cannot be easily explained in terms of
interest-rate effects (Chart 3), because interest
rates, like investment, move in a strongly pro-
cyclical fashion. (Interest rates generally peak at
the GNP peak, and reach a low point just after
the GNPtrough.) Interest rates can significantly
affect investment, ofcourse, primarily by helping
to determine the best long-run ratio ofcapital to
output, but over the cycle, the level of output
tends to have more effect than interest rates on
new investmentspending. Thusinvestment tends
to be concentrated in the transition and mature-
recovery periods ofthe cycle, when by definition
the highest levels of output occur.
The transition and mature-recovery periods
are similar because both are periods of heavy
investment, but they differ in respect to patterns
of inflation-with accelerated inflation being
evident only in the mature-recovery phase. This
distinction may reflect the fact that capital is the
only effective factor constraint on continued
output growth during the transition period,
Chart 3
Cyclical Changes in Investment and Interest Rates
(Average of five post war cycles)
Annual Change (%)
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succeeding trough
whereas both capital and labor act as factor
constraints during the mature-recovery phase.
The different behavior of the economy in these
two periods implies that there is a systematic
difference in the economic response to the two
kinds of factor constraint.
III. Aggregate Demand and Supply
In a single-factor model, with the unemploy-
ment rate used as a general measure of the
amount of demand pressure, the economy may
be faced with an aggregate supply function as
shown in the left panel of Chart 4. If output is
below its full-employment level, expansive
monetary and fiscal policy will tend to increase
aggregate demand and reduce unemployment
(shifting demand from DI toward D2), but with
relatively small inflationary consequences be-
cause of the availability of excess factor re-
sources. If output is above its full-employment
level, however, expansive aggregate-demand
policy will have a greater impact on prices than
on output, because ofthe lack ofavailablefactor
resources.
This single-factor model may be incompletein
certain circuII1stances, because of the different
rates of adjustment in the capital and labor
markets. Full capacity utilization will occasion-
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ally be reached before full employment, leading
to a supply function such as that shown in the
right panel ofChart4. Ifoutput is below the full-
capacitylevel, neithercapital norlaborwill actas
a constraint. In that case, expansionary
aggregate-demand policy will tend to increase
income, lower unemployment, and increase ca-
pacity utilization. As in the single-factor model,
the factor markets would generate little infla-
tionary pressure within this range of income.
When income reaches the full-employment
level, however, both available capital and avail-
able labor act as constraints on real output,
although capital does so only by requiring a
switch ofresources away from consumption and
toward investment. When bothlaborand capital
are fully utilized, expansive monetary and fiscal
policy cannot be expected to produce further
large additions to output. At that point, the only
effective way of increasing real income will be aChart 4
Aggregate Supply and Demand
ghangein
inflation rate




















Income and Interest Rates
the full-capacity level ofincome, the investment
function tends to shift upward as business in-
creases its estimate of the future demand for
output (Chart 5). This in turn shifts upward the
IS schedule, the total demand for· goods and
services. We can then determine a complete
solution by adding the LM curve, which indi-
cates the similar trade-off determined in the
financial markets. As IS shifts upward on reach-
ing full capacity (Ye), income and investment
both increase, and so do interest rates.
Income
IS
structural policy, designed to shift the supply
curve itself to the right.
Just as in thesingle-factormodel, ifbothlabor
and capital are less than fully employed (at
aggregate-demandline DI'), we may experience
little acceleration and perhaps even some decel-
eration of inflation. Inflation in actuality tends
to decelerate at low levels of aggregate de-
mand-that is, in late recession and early recov-
ery. But the slope of the aggregate supply sche-
dule S' is quite low where it is crossed by the
low-aggregate-demand line Dr, which implies
that a large shortfall in aggregate demand is
required to produce a modest decrease in the
inflation rate.
12 In contrast, the slope of the
aggregate-supply schedule is steep where it is
crossed by the high-aggregate-demand schedule
D3', which implies that the policy impact on the
inflation rate mostly occurs during the mature-
recovery period ofvery high aggregate demand.
Also, as we argued in Section I, a transition
period exists between the early-recovery and
mature-recovery periods, which is milrked by a
low transmission of inflation. We can now see
that this is the portion of the aggregate-supply
schedule .crossed by the middle aggregate-
demand schedule D2'.
Between the stages of full capacity and full
employment, further growth depends on an
increased demand for investment goods at any
level ofinterest rates. As income approaches Ye,
37IV. Implications for Current Policy
In this paper,we haveemphasizedthefact that
the capital market adjusts more rapidly thanthe
labor market over the cycle, which implies thata
transition phase exists between the period offull
capacity use and the period offull employment.
This phase is relevant to us becausethe economy
now seems to be in the midst of just such a
transition, moving toward a mature-recovery
period. In the past, capital accumulation has
been significant only in the transition and
mature-recovery periods, and not in the earlier
stage of expansion. Thus, if we failed to enter
these cyclical phases, we might experience a
permanently reduced rate ofgrowth ofthe capi-
tal stock and hence ofproductivity. On the other
hand, a mature recovery carries inflationary
seeds ofdestruction within itself, so thatwe must
recognize the warning signals and avoid overly
full use of the factor markets.
The upward shift in the investment schedule
which typifies the transition period is theclearest
guide to the policy signals which can be antic-
ipated in the advanced stages of recovery. First,
we should look for a rapidly rising ratio of
investment to output. Secondly, we should rec-
ognize that any given setting offiscal and mone-
tary policy will produce more inflation than it
did earlier in the recovery. The danger at sucha
point is that policymakers will resist the interest-
rate increases which characterize the transition,
and thereby overstimulate the economy and
bring it rapidly from a wasteful state of unused
resources to an inflationary state of overfull
employment. To some extent, this is what hap-
pened in the closing stages of both the 1954-57
and 1970-73 expansions. 13
In both 1954-57 and 1970-73, the transition
was quite brief, with capacity utilization moving
from 8412 percent to cyclical peaks in the 87-88
percent range within two to three quarters.
Because of the brevity of those transition peri-
ods, the bulk of each cycle's net capital accumu-
lation occurred in the mature-recovery period. In
contrast, the 1964-65 transition period was pro-
longed more than two years by shifting but
generally tight monetary policy measures which
permitted both higher interest rates and a higher
investment-output ratio.
The current recovery appears to be in its own
transition phase. The unemployment rate, at
slightly below 6 percent, is still quite high by the
standards ofearliercycles. Yet interest rates have
moved sharply upward, with Treasury bill rates
up almost 200 basis points to date this year, and
with the bill-futures market expecting even fur-
ther increases. Meanwhile, the investm..:nt-
output ratio has begun to rise, from a static level
of 9.7 percent in 1977 to 10.2 percent in the
second quarter of 1978. That combination of
circumstances suggests that it would be wise to
avoid overstimulating the economy during this
transition phase. In particular, the rising level of
(present and prospective) interest rates appears
to be an integral component of real growth in a
capital-constrained economy. If such increases
are not resisted by policy, and if monetary
growth is kept to a steady path, the recovery
should be able to continuefor sometime without
a further acceleration of inflation.
FOOTNOTES
1. See George Perry (1974) and MichaelWachter. (1977)
2. See Robert Rasche and John Tatom. (1977)
2. The structural problems are important, as has been
seen in Rose McElhattan's article in thisReview (1977J.
But the evidence should not be overemphasized, The
lowest post-Korea unemployment was not reached in
the expansions of the 1950s, but as recently as 1969.
4. The investment, labor force, and interest-rate impli-
cations of the factor-usage rates are discusSed in the
next section.
5. The dates where the labor market began to weaken
are chosen as the endpoints of mature recoveries.
Because of the short lag between GNP growth and
labor-market growth, the 1960-69 recovery is onequar-
ter longer and the 1970-73 recovery three quarters
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longer than is indicated by the official National Bureau
data.
6. A more detailed examination of the recession and
early-recovery relation between the two factor-market
measures was presented in the Spring 1977 issue ofthe
Review. The present article focuses on this relation in
transition and mature recovery.
7. Real GNP has grown at an annual rate of almost
exactly 5 112 percent in the firsteightquarters ofeach of
the five most recent business-cycle recoveries.
8. The narrowdifference in the cycle averages accounts
for the general assumption that the two measures are
interchangeable. Statistical methods based on long
spans of time must account first and foremost for large
swings in behavior. In the factor markets, these are thelarge r1l()vernentsinfactor use centered on the reces-
sion troughofthe business cycle.
9. Theaverage increase in unemploymentin the last five
recessions was 3.1 percent of the labor force; the
average dec.line in capacity utilization was 14.9 percent
of total utilization. The ratio ofthetwo-4.8-measures
the relative cyclicity of the two.
10. Monetary policy was generally restrictive through-
out the Eisenhower years. Also, the end of Korean War
price controls in the Spring of1953 pushed the inflation
above what might have been expected during the 1953-
54 period of recession and early recovery.
11. Adjustment does occur in such markets. If low
employment persists for long enough, some of the
unemployed will lower their estimates of their future
earning power and either leave the labor force or lower
their wage offer. If low capacity utilization persists,
some firms will not replace depreciated plant and
equipment. Such changes in expected future returns to
capital and labor may also produce long-term stability
of factor-usage rates in these markets. A reduced
expected return to capital lowers the desired capital
stock and makes the hiring of labormoreattractive, and
thus creates an incentive to sh ift to more labor-
intensive technology over the long term. Thus the
notion of a fixed factor is a short-term concept; in the
long term, all inputs to production are variable. But a
large difference remains in the way short-term fixed
and variable factors affect the nation's effective econ-
omic capacity.
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12. R.J. Gordon (1976), in a recent survey ofthePhillips
Curve literature, argued that theory provides scant
guidance as to the slope ofthe aggregate-supplysche-
dule. He also noted that empirical economists have
become steadily more gloomy concerning the strength
of this trade-off.
13. This is not to say that policy of itself ended either
expansion. Rather, policy led to a state of extremely
high aggregate demand, and thus made the economy
vulnerable to any sort of downward shock to either
aggregate supply or demand. The 1973 oil-supply
shock, for instance, marked the end of recovery, al-
though full employment had not been reached by mid-
1973.
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